The Secret of Our Success: The Sixth Circuit Interprets the Proof Requirement under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in V Secret Catalogue v. Moseley by Hemerly, Jennifer
Volume 9 Issue 2 Article 4 
2002 
The Secret of Our Success: The Sixth Circuit Interprets the Proof 
Requirement under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in V Secret 
Catalogue v. Moseley 
Jennifer Hemerly 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer Hemerly, The Secret of Our Success: The Sixth Circuit Interprets the Proof Requirement under the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act in V Secret Catalogue v. Moseley, 9 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports L.J. 321 
(2002). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol9/iss2/4 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
THE "SECRET" OF OUR SUCCESS: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
INTERPRETS THE PROOF REQUIREMENT UNDER
THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT IN
V SECRET CATALOGUE v. MOSELEY
[D]ilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will
inevitably destroy the advertising value of [a] mark.'
I. INTRODUCTION
President Clinton signed into law the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act ("FTDA") 2 onJanuary 16, 1996, amending the Lanham Act
of 1946,3 to create a cause of action for trademark dilution.4 The
motivation behind the FTDA was to provide consistent protection
to "famous" trademarks.5 Prior to the FTDA, only twenty-five states
enacted dilution statutes, limiting the available avenues for trade-
mark dilution allegations. 6 These state statutes vary widely on the
standards required for finding dilution. 7 Unlike trademark in-
fringement, which allows a trademark owner to sue because con-
sumers are confused by similar trademarks used to advance
comparable goods and services, trademark dilution protects the
1. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030.
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The House of Repre-
sentatives passed the FTDA on December 16, 1995, and the Senate followed on
December 29, 1995. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3; 141 CONG. REc. S19310 (daily
ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
4. See Brent G. Seitz, Note, The Actual Harm Requirement and the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act: Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Division of Travel Development, 10 DEPAUL-LCAJ. ART & ENT. L. 113, 113
(1999). Dilution is defined as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2)
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
5. See Kathleen B. McCabe, Note, Dilution-By-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the
Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1827, 1860 (2000) (noting
that FTDA was enacted "to rectify and clarify erroneous analyses of dilution," but
nothing has changed and courts still apply erroneous precedent or create artificial
restrictions).
6. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley ("Victoria's Secret"), 259 F.3d 464,
468 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting protection was only available on patch-quilt system).
7. See id. For a list of the state anti-dilution statutes, see infra note 53.
(321)
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trademark's distinctive quality from the tarnishing or blurring of a
similar mark advancing any good or service. 8
Recently, conflicting judicial interpretations have thwarted the
FTDA and caused its failure in protecting trademarks. 9 Some cir-
cuit courts have required plaintiffs to demonstrate an "actual dilu-
tion" to their famous mark in order to obtain injunctive relief.'0
Other circuits have permitted injunctive relief by requiring the
plaintiff to show only a "likelihood of dilution" to their famous
mark." Most recently, in V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley ("Victoria's
Secret"),' 2 the Sixth Circuit addressed the dispute of whether the
FTDA permits an inference of "likely harm" rather than requiring
proof of "actual harm."13 After interpreting the language of the
FTDA and the congressional record, the court concluded that a
claim of dilution need only show a "likelihood of dilution."1 4
8. See MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS 31 (2000) (distinguishing
dilution claim from infringement because dilution does not require proof of con-
fusion); RICHARD STIM, TRADEMARK LAw 14 (2000) (indicating owners of famous
mark can prevent tarnishing or diluting of mark's distinctive quality by suing in
federal court). The difference between infringement and dilution has been de-
scribed by reaction. For instance:
[I]f a parent says to the kids, "let's go pick something out at Blockbuster
tonight," and the youngest child assumes they will be buying fireworks
made by Viacom, that is evidence of the confusion that is essential to a
claim of trademark infringement. But if the oldest child answers, "which
Blockbuster," that evidences dilution by blurring.
Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 891 n.9 (8th Cir. 1998). Also,
infringement protects the rights of the trademark owner and the public's right to
be free from confusion, but dilution protects only a private interest. See 2 JEROME
GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.12[1] [a]; cf Gerard
N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 85
MINN. L. REv. 949, 1035 (2001) (asserting "[d]ilution and infringement are one
and inseparable").
9. SeeJennifer Mae Slonaker, Comment, Conflicting Interpretations of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act Create Inadequate Famous Mark Protection, 26 U. DAYTON L.
REv. 121, 122-23 (2000) (explaining discrepancies between circuits).
10. See Gail Dalickas, Proof of Actual Harm Isn't (Is?) Required in Dilution Claim
Circuits Vary Widely in Their Approach to Trademark Law, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
Sept. 6, 2001, at 5 (indicating Fourth and Fifth Circuits require "actual dilution");
see, e.g., Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670 (5th Cir.
2000); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 1999).
11. See Dalickas, supra note 10 (demonstrating Sixth Circuit joined Second
and Seventh Circuits requiring "likelihood of dilution"); see, e.g., Victoria's Secret,
259 F.3d at 475; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir.
2000); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 1999).
12. 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001).
13. See id. at 466 (questioning whether district court erred by failing to re-
quire proof of "actual economic loss").
14. See id. at 475 (explaining agreement with Second Circuit's analysis in
Nabisco).
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This Note examines the court's interpretation and application
of the FTDA in Victoria's Secret to determine whether a claim of dilu-
tion requires proof of "actual harm" or allows for a lesser "likeli-
hood" standard to render injunctive relief.15 Part II introduces the
parties and states the relevant facts of Victoria's Secret.16 Part III ex-
plains the history of the FTDA and the circuit split that has devel-
oped.17 Part IV explains the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Victoria's
Secret and the precedents upon which it based its decision.18 Part V
critically assesses the holding of Victoria's Secret in light of other cir-
cuits' decisions. 19 Finally, Part VI explores the likely effect that the
Victoria's Secret decision will have on the future of trademark
dilution. 20
II. FAcTs
Since 1981, the "Victoria's Secret" mark has been registered in
the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 21 The company
sells women's lingerie, clothing and various other accessories. 22
When this case commenced, there were over 750 Victoria's Secret
store locations, two of which are located in Louisville, Kentucky,
within sixty miles of the Defendants' store. 23 In addition to numer-
ous store locations, Victoria's Secret distributes over 400 million
copies of their catalog each year.24 Victoria's Secret also holds an-
nual fashion shows, teaming up with the American Broadcasting
15. For a factual summary and discussion of the two leading cases on this
issue, see infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the relevant facts in Victoria's Secret, see infra notes 21-
35 and accompanying text.
17. For a detailed discussion of the background law that preceded the deci-
sion, see infra notes 36-100 and accompanying text.
18. For a detailed analysis of the Sixth Circuit's decision, see infra notes 101-
36 and accompanying text.
19. For a detailed critique of the court's reasoning, see infra notes 137-64 and
accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the impact of Victoria's Secret, see infra notes 165-90 and
accompanying text.
21. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. is record owner of "Victoria's Secret" mark). The "Victoria Secret"
mark is licensed to Victoria's Secret Catalog, LLC and Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc.
See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. (stating stores in Louisville have been operating since November
16, 1982 and April 24, 1985). In 2001, Victoria's Secret Stores totaled 958. See
Hoover's Database, 2001, Intimate Brands, Inc., available at http://www.lexis.com/
research/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2001).
24. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 466 (noting 39,000 of 400 million catalogs
distributed to Elizabethtown, Kentucky, location of Defendants' store). Victoria's
Secret also sells products over the Internet. See id.
3
Hemerly: The Secret of Our Success: The Sixth Circuit Interprets the Proof
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
324 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
Company (ABC) Television Network in 2001 for a nationally broad-
cast, primetime entertainment special.25 Additionally, Victoria's Se-
cret models frequently make guest appearances on game shows and
primetime television.2 6 The corporation spent over fifty-five million
dollars on advertising in 1998.27 In a survey taken before the law-
suit, Victoria's Secret ranked as the ninth most famous brand in the
apparel industry.28
In February, 1998, Victor and Cathy Moseley opened "Victor's
Secret." 29 The store's inventory includes men's and women's linge-
rie, but also adult entertainment novelties, such as sex toys and
adult videos.30 A few days after the store's opening, counsel for Vic-
toria's Secret sent the Moseleys a cease and desist letter, claiming
25. See Press Release, Victoria's Secret Annual Fashion Show Returns to New
York City with a First-Ever ABC Primetime Special (Nov. 1, 2001), available at http:/
/intimatebrands.com/press/fulltext.asp?prID=293. Andrea Wong, ABC executive
in charge of alternative programming, classified the fashion show as "pure, escapist
entertainment." David Bauder, Victoria's Secret Special Draws Fire on Many Fronts,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2001, at C4. Actor Rupert Everett hosted the fashion show,
with additional entertainment including tenor Andrea Bocelli, hip-hop singer
MaryJ. Blige, a twenty-piece orchestra and The Broadway Gospel Choir. See Sylvi
Capelaci, Secrets Revealed; Victoria's Secret Lingerie Takes Flight, THE TORONTO SUN,
Nov. 20, 2001, at 42 (describing details of televised fashion show); Tina Cassidy,
Revealing Look at Secret Collection, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 15, 2001, at DI (report-
ing "nothing like this has ever been done before"). Past Victoria's Secret fashion
shows have also been broadcasted via the Internet. See Press Release, Victoria's
Secret Cannes 2000 Fashion Show Webcast Takes Global Brand Awareness to New
Levels (June 6, 2000), available at http://www.intimatebrands.com/press/2000/
cannes2000.asp (reporting unprecedented responses to Victoria's Secret Cannes
2000 Fashion Show Webcast); see also Miles Socha, On With the Show; All the Web's a
Stage, and Designers, Celebrities and Consumers Can Get in on the Act, WOMEN'S WEAR
DAILY, May 12, 2000, at 14S (noting fashion brands often do not involve entertain-
ment, however, Victoria's Secret's fashion show broadcast live online "[is] an in-
stance when the fashion world is entertaining").
26. See Bamet D. Wolf, Fashion Show's Exposure a Bit Much For Some People, Co-
LUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 25, 2001, at IG (commenting on Victoria's Secret models
appearing as contestants on game show Who Wants to Be a Millionaire and as guests
on ABC talk show The View). Victoria's Secret models have also made guest appear-
ances on primetime television shows such as ABC's Spin City. See Spin City: The
Wedding Scammer (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 13, 2001).
27. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 466 (discussing extent of Victoria's Secret's
advertising expenses).
28. See id. Victoria's Secret is a 2.4 billion dollar international lingerie con-
glomerate. See Beverly Bartlett, 'If Victoria Can Have a Secret, Victor Can Have a Se-
cret.' Lingerie Giant's Big Guns Go After Little Kentucky Shop, THE COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), June 29, 1998, at IA.
29. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 466. The 800 square-foot shop opened in a
strip mall in Elizabethtown, Kentucky. See Bartlett, supra note 28 (quoting Victor
Moseley as saying "[i]f Victoria can have a secret . .. Victor can have a secret").
30. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 466; see also Bartlett, supra note 28 (noting
Moseley's store also sells lava lamps and leather jackets, with adult novelties dis-
played in small room in back of store).
[Vol. 9: p. 321
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the store name constituted trademark infringement.31  The
Moseleys changed the name of the store to "Victor's Little Secret,"
but Victoria's Secret was not satisfied with the change.3 2 Victoria's
Secret commenced an action against the Moseleys, alleging "federal
trademark infringement, unfair competition under [s] ection 43 (a)
of the Trademark Act, violation of the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act, and common law trademark infringement and unfair competi-
tion."33 Evaluating the case under the FTDA, the district court
found that the Moseleys' mark blurred and tarnished the "Victoria's
Secret" mark, therefore, granting Victoria's Secret summary judg-
ment and enjoining further use of the "Victor's Little Secret"
mark.3 4 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, applying the Sec-
ond Circuit's dilution test that requires an inference of likely
harm.3 5
III. BACKGROUND
A trademark is defined as "includ[ing] any word, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof- (1) used by a person,
or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce
. . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those
manufactured or sold by others .... ,3 6 Trademarks function as a
guarantee of quality, allowing consumers to identify products they
31. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 466-67; see also Gary Young, Victor/Victoria
and Trademark Dilution, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13, 2001, at B6 (noting Moseleys' claim
that they were unaware of Victoria's Secret stores and catalog when naming their
store). The Moseleys asserted that the name developed out of Victor keeping his
plans to open a business a secret from his previous employer. See Bartlett, supra
note 28.
32. See Bartlett, supra note 28 (noting adding "Little" to name was attempt to
accommodate Victoria's Secret).
33. Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 467. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the Moseleys on the federal infringement claims, which were not at issue
on appeal. See id.
34. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1092, 1096
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2000).
35. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 466 (applying Second Circuit's analysis of
dilution).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). A trademark has also been seen
as "a narrow bridge over which all the traffic powered by [product] advertising
must pass .... With time, the symbol comes to be more than a conduit through
which the persuasive power of advertising is transmitted, and acquires a potency, a
'commercial magnetism,' of its own." Magliocca, supra note 8, at 960 (citing Ralph
S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57
YAIE L.J. 1165, 1191-98 (1948)).
5
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have found satisfactory in the past.37 Under common law, in order
to save the goodwill of businesses and prevent the sale of defective
goods, an owner of a trademark could bring an action of deceit to
protect the mark.38 Such protection of trademarks was limited to
related goods that were in direct competition. 39 Early trademark
law focused on prohibiting deceptively similar marks that confused
consumers into buying cheap imitations. 40
The concept of trademark dilution originated in German and
British law. 41 In 1927, Frank I. Schechter introduced trademark di-
lution to the United States in his article, The Rational Basis of Trade-
mark Protection.42 His article suggested that the only rational basis
for protecting a trademark was the "preservation of [its] unique-
ness." 43 This conclusion contradicted his account of trademark law
37. SeeJerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2000, 37 Hous. L. REv.
729, 750 (2000) (describing brand of product as "promise" of certain characteris-
tics). Modern trademarks are derived from two different sources. See Frank I.
Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813, 814
(1927). First, the proprietary mark was an optional mark that was often used by
merchants to aid illiterate clerks or allow goods to be identified and reclaimed in
case of piracy or shipwreck. See id. Second, the regulatory production mark was
required by statute or administrative order and used to trace defective work back
to the source or help confiscate smuggled goods. See id.
38. See Schechter, supra note 37, at 819 (asserting beginnings of trademark
law focused on protection of consumers). During the large scale production of
the Industrial Revolution, trademarks became essential for producers to differenti-
ate their products from other competitors. See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilu-
tion: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PiTr. L.
REv. 789, 797-98 (1997). Trademarks became even more important with the intro-
duction of retailers and middlemen because without the mark, the consumer
would not know who produced the product. See id. at 799.
39. See Klieger, supra note 38, at 800 (noting trademark law unable to keep
pace with modern trade realities).
40. See Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd, Note, Famous Trademarks: Ordinary Inquiry by
the Courts of Marks Entitled to an Extraordinary Remedy, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 423, 424
(1998) (noting dual purpose was protecting consumer and producer from imita-
tion goods and services). Under dilution law, consumer protection is not consid-
ered. See id. at 425.
41. See Stephen Bullock, Proving a Claim Under the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act - Are the Courts Diluting the FDA ?, 3 Loy. INTELL. PROP. & HIGH TECH. J. 1, 1
(2000) (citing Walter J. Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Anti-
Dilution Statutes, 44 CAL. L. REv. 439, 448 (1956)).
42. See Schechter, supra note 37, at 813 (discussing historical preconceptions
of trademark function); see also Klieger, supra note 38, at 796 (tracing "birth of
dilution as a recognized theory" to Schechter); Swann, supra note 37, at 730 (de-
picting Schechter's article as "tour de force in its primal recognition of brand
power"). The term "dilution" came from Odol, a German case holding that the
well-known mark used for mouth wash was diluted by its use for various steel prod-
ucts. See Schechter, supra note 37, at 831-32.
43. Schechter, supra note 37, at 831 (suggesting German law fortifies conclu-
sion that preservation of uniqueness is only rational basis for trademark
protection).
[Vol. 9: p. 321
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two years earlier in his book, which reiterated the consumer confu-
sion test used in trademark infringement.44 Schechter shied away
from the requirement of confusion; instead recognizing that dilu-
tion can occur even when the original user's mark ("senior mark")
does not directly compete with the defendant's mark ('junior
mark"). 4 5 He argued that simultaneous use of a mark creates a
"gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon
the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-compet-
ing goods."4 6 This depletion of a trademark's selling power directly
correlates to its uniqueness, requiring absolute protection of that
uniqueness to preserve everything the mark symbolizes.
4 7
Schechter's attempt to protect fanciful or arbitrary marks proved
unsuccessful, however, when Congress failed to adopt a new federal
trademark law a few years later.48
In 1946, Congress passed the Lanham Act, which protected a
trademark if the junior mark was "likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive." 49 The Lanham Act disregarded
Schechter's dilution proposal and adopted a consumer confusion
test to prove trademark infringement.5 0 Despite this exclusion
under federal law, the theory of dilution began to emerge at the
44. See Klieger, supra note 38, at 801-02 (noting Schechter's book laid ground-
work for 1927 article).
45. See id. at 803; see also Terry Ahearn, Comment, Dilution by Blurring Under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: What Is it and How Is it Shown?, 41 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 893, 898 (2001) (noting Schechter moved away from confusion ra-
tionale given rapidly growing economy and advances in trade).
46. Schechter, supra note 37, at 825 (identifying relationship between distinc-
tiveness and need for protection).
47. See Ahearn, supra note 45, at 898 (emphasizing "firm that invests
thousands of dollars developing a mark should not have to stand idle while other
users strip the mark of its commercial magnetism"). "[T] he value of the modern
trademark lies in its selling power;.., this selling power depends for its psychologi-
cal hold upon the public, not merely upon the merit of the goods upon which it is
used, but equally upon its own uniqueness and singularity... Schechter, supra
note 37, at 831.
48. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 454 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing H.R. 11592, 72d Cong.
§ 2(d) (3) (1932)); Swann, supra note 37, at 732-33, 738-39 (noting resistance to
Schechter may have existed because his theory did not evolve from precedent).
49. Patrick M. Bible, Comment, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Fed-
eral Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70
U. COLO. L. REv. 295, 297 (1998) (citing Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994),
and explaining theory behind Act's protections when defendant infringes upon
trademark).
50. See Klieger, supra note 38, at 810 (indicating Lanham Act appeared to
leave Schechter's proposal "as a mere footnote in the development of trademark
law"). By 1946, courts had been applying the confusion test to non-competing
goods. See id. at 810.
327
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state level. 5 1 Massachusetts became the first state to adopt an anti-
dilution statute. 52 Other states cautiously followed, adopting lan-
guage similar to that used in Massachusetts.5 3 Also, the United
States Trademark Association amended the Model State Trademark
51. See Bible, supra note 49, at 300 (indicating influence dilution held in com-
mon law unfair competition claims caused state legislatures to enact state anti-
dilution statutes).
52. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. l10B, § 12 (West 1996). The statute
provides:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinc-
tive quality of a mark registered under this chapter, or a mark valid at
common law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be a ground for
injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the
parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
Id. The Massachusetts legislature adopted Schechter's dilution theory in order to
complement consumer confusion. See Klieger, supra note 38, at 811. The dilution
statute approved by the Massachusetts House of Representatives offered absolute
protection to unique marks, leaving the consumer protection model to apply to
remaining marks. See id. at 812. The final statute enacted into law, however, cov-
ered any trademark, regardless of uniqueness. See id. (enacting dilution statute
rendered consumer confusion test immaterial).
53. See Bible, supra note 49, at 300 (recognizing trend set by Massachusetts).
Currently, over half the states have passed anti-dilution statutes. See Lynda J. Os-
wald, "Tarnishment" and "Blurring" Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995,
36 AM. Bus. L.J. 255, 266 n.59 (1999) (citing ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1993); ALASKA
STAT. § 45.50.180 (Michie 1996); Ai. CODE ANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie 1996); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330(a) (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11i(c)
(West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 495.151
(Harrison 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 48-513 (Michie
1997); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1035/15 (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.113
(West 1997); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:223.1 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1530 (West 1997); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. lOB, § 12 (1996); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 325D.165 (West 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25 (Supp. 1998); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 417.061 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1997);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13.20 (West Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-10 (Michie
1995); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 360-1 (McKinney Supp. 1998); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 647.107 (1995); 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-
2-12 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-1165 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West Supp. 1998);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.160 (Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 47-2-13 (1996);
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 40-1-115 (Michie 1997)). In addition, Colorado, Michigan, New
Jersey and Ohio include dilution as part of their common law. See id. (citing cases
following common law approach).
All anti-dilution statutes are similar because they apply to all distinctive marks
and require proof of a "likelihood of dilution" before issuing an injunction, which
is the only form of relief available. See Klieger, supra note 38, at 813-14 (drawing
from three important features that all state statutes share). Another similarity
shared by the state anti-dilution statutes is that they only look at loss of distinctive-
ness, not the senior mark's economic value. See Seitz, supra note 4, at 117 (indicat-
ing additional feature shared by all state anti-dilution statutes).
[Vol. 9: p. 321
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Bill5 4 to include a provision for dilution.55 This surge of anti-dilu-
tion law initially failed to assist trademark holders because federal
and state courts were reluctant to apply state statutes.5 6 When state
courts did apply the statutes, they struggled to devise a definition
for dilution and still questioned the applicable components of the
law.57 Their uncertainty caused them to oppose issuing injunctions
that would apply in states that had not adopted a dilution statute. 58
Additionally, courts were apprehensive about granting relief that
would obstruct free competition, giving trademark owners an exclu-
sive right.59
The unwillingness of the courts to accept state dilution laws
created "a patchwork system of protection."60  Recognizing the
need for a uniform nationwide remedy, Congress enacted the Fed-
54. United States Trademark Assoc. Model State Trademark Bill (1964), re-
printed in 4J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 22:8 (4th ed. 1996).
55. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 54, § 24:81 (noting federal anti-dilution provi-
sions that were not enacted in 1988 were included in revision of Model Bill); Bible,
supra note 49, at 300 (noting addition of dilution provision started domino effect
among states).
56. See Ahearn, supra note 45, at 900 (noting judicial hostility towards state
dilution statutes because difficulty defining dilution). It was not until 1977 that a
state court admitted a trademark needs protection "beyond that provided by ac-
tions for infringement" against the "cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or
services which feeds upon the business reputation of an established distinctive
trade-mark (sic) or name." Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369
N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1977)).
57. See Brian Lerner, Notes & Comments, Sneaking Through the Back Door With
Pepperidge Farm: The Monopoly Advantage of Dilution, 20 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 429,
437 (2000) (noting courts questioned possible requirement of consumer confu-
sion, what made marks famous and whether dilution was applicable to non-com-
peting goods and services). See generally Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor
Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring) (developing
factors to determine "likelihood of dilution" under New York anti-dilution statute).
58. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030-31 (describing necessity of federal statute because courts' reluctance to
provide relief under state anti-dilution statutes); Slonaker, supra note 9, at 127
("Many state courts were reluctant to issue nationwide injunctions, recognizing the
problems inherent in applying such injunctions in states that had not made dilu-
tion unlawful.").
59. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. b
(indicating reluctance because goods sold under similar trademarks were not in
competition with each other); Klieger, supra note 38, at 862 (suggesting dilution
law encourages barriers to new competition).
60. 141 CONG. REc. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch). State dilution laws began to cause several problems. See Ahearn, supra
note 45, at 901. First, the courts were still reluctant to move away from traditional
trademark infringement. See id. Second, such a scattered system among the states
encouraged forum shopping. See id. (noting that parties looked for states with
dilution statutes to bring their claim). Third, injunctions could not be enforced
on a national scale, therefore protection became worthless. See id.
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eral Trademark Dilution Act.6 1 This federal statute was not enacted
to preempt state anti-dilution statutes, but rather offered a federal
remedy to trademark owners. 62 The FTDA defines dilution as "the
61. See Slonaker, supra note 9, at 127-28 ("Because the patch work of state
anti-dilution statutes was often unpredictable and unavailing... Congress was fi-
nally compelled to enact the Federal Trademark Dilution Act."); see also 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1125(c), 1127 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The Act reads, in pertinent part:
(c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks.
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the princi-
ples of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to
an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce
of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has be-
come famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsec-
tion. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a
court may consider factors such as, but not limited to-
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with
the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C) the duration
and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geo-
graphical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E)
the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas
and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person
against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of
use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether
the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of
February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous
mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief unless the person
against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on
the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark. If
such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous mark shall also
be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 1117(a) and 1118 of
this title, subject to the discretion of the court and principles of eq-
uity ....
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing
goods or services of the owner of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Adoption of these changes to the Lanham Act came as a
surprise because an attempt to include anti-dilution provisions in the 1988 Trade-
mark Law Revision Act proved unsuccessful. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 455 n.2 (4th Cir.)
(citing David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531,
537 (1991)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999).
62. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (explaining FTDA would coexist with state
dilution law, allowing state laws to apply "in cases involving locally famous or dis-
tinctive marks"); see also 2 GILSON, supra note 8, § 5.12[1] [c] [iv] (explaining state
dilution law not preempted by federal law, but suggesting plaintiffs will most often
choose federal law); 4 McCARTHY, supra note 54, § 24:82 (agreeing FTDA does not
preempt state statutes); Gary Myers, Statutory Interpretation, Property Rights, and
Boundaries: The Nature and Limits of Protection in Trademark Dilution, Trade Dress, and
Product Configuration Cases, 23 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & ARTS 241, 280 (2000) (noting
10
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lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distin-
guish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1)
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other par-
ties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception. ' 63 In or-
der to establish a claim of dilution, "(1) the senior mark must be
famous; (2) it must be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be a com-
mercial use in commerce; (4) it must begin after the senior mark
has become famous; and (5) it must cause dilution of the distinctive
quality of the senior mark."64 The first requirement, that the senior
mark be famous, is applicable only under federal law, not state
law. 65
Absent the confusion requirement under trademark infringe-
ment, the FTDA protects famous marks against subsequent uses
that would blur or tarnish the mark's distinctiveness.66 Dilution by
preemption "would have fostered uniformity and prevented expansive interpreta-
tions of state dilution law").
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
64. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999) (estab-
lishing five-part test for dilution); see also Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562,
577 (6th Cir. 2000) (adopting five-part test in Nabisco); Sporty's Farm, L.L.C. v.
Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497 (2d Cir. 2000) (identifying differences
between fame and distinctiveness), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000); Kellogg Co.
v. Toucan Golf, Inc., No. 4:99-cv-91, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14451, at *29 (W.D.
Mich. Sept. 6, 2001) (adopting five-part test). But see Times Mirror Magazines, Inc.
v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 166-67 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding
FTDA does not subject mark to test for fame and separate test for distinctiveness),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1071 (2001). The Sixth Circuit followed the Nabisco test. See
Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d 464, 468-69 (6th Cir. 2001). Unlike many other four-
part tests created from the FTDA, the Nabisco court adds a separate requirement
that the mark be distinctive, noting that "[i]t is quite clear that the statute intends
distinctiveness, in addition to fame, as an essential element." Nabisco, 191 F.3d at
216; cf Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998)
(adopting four-part test to determine dilution). The Victoria's Secret court, how-
ever, found the Nabisco test substantially similar to other four-part tests. See Victo-
ria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 469.
65. See generally W. Whitaker Rayner, In Search of a Dilution Solution: Implementa-
tion of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 20 Miss. C. L. REv. 93, 95 (1999) (distin-
guishing FTDA from state statutes as providing remedy only for famous marks).
66. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2-3 (discussing FTDA amended sections 43
and 45 of Lanham Act); see also Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Columbia/HCA Health-
care Corp., 964 F. Supp. 733, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (describing dilution occurring in
two forms, either blurring or tarnishment). Trademark infringement occurs when
a consumer is confused, by the unauthorized use of a mark, into believing that the
goods or services came from the mark's owner. See Andrew L. Deutsch, Ruling
Creates a Split in Dilution Jurisprudence, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 25, 1999, at C22. Trademark
dilution, however, occurs when the unauthorized use of a famous mark, though
not confusing consumers, "weakens the uniquely distinctive 'selling power' of the
famous mark (blurring) or casts disrepute upon the mark (tarnishment)." Id.; see
also 4 McCARTHY, supra note 54, § 24:67 (adding cybersquatting as emerging third
type of dilution).
11
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blurring is the more traditional type of trademark injury. 67 Blur-
ring occurs when a junior holder's use of a mark creates an associa-
tion by the consumer between the actual mark and the junior user's
goods.68 Because two products are now associated with the mark, it
loses its ability to uniquely identify a specific product.69 Alterna-
tively, dilution by tarnishment affects a consumer's positive evalua-
tion of a product in a more direct and damaging manner than
blurring.70 Tarnishing occurs when the junior holder's use of the
mark improperly associates the famous mark with an inferior or of-
fensive product or service. 71 Though the mark still uniquely identi-
67. See Bible, supra note 49, at 305 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c (1995)) (stating blurring usually occurs to marks that
create "positive response that is associated exclusively with the goods or services of
the trademark owner"). Dilution by blurring has also been considered dilution of
the source-representation function of a trademark or typicality dilution. See
Klieger, supra note 38, at 823.
68. See Danjaq, LLC v. Sony Corp., CV 97-8414-ER (Mcx), 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22231, at *13-14 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 1998) (suggesting that dilution by blur-
ring is likely to occur if defendant uses James Bond mark for movies); 141 CONG.
REc. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (providing exam-
ples of when blurring would occur, such as if DuPont mark was used for shoes,
Buick for aspirin or Kodak for pianos); 4 McCARTHY, supra note 54, § 24:68 (sug-
gesting customers will identify plaintiffs mark with other sources on many differ-
ent goods and services); see also Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153,
1159-60 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding trademark "Hyatt Legal Services" would blur pub-
lic's identification with Hyatt hotel chain).
69. See McCabe, supra note 5, at 1842-43; see also Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim
Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting 3 McCARTHY
§ 2413[1] [a] [i] at 24-106, who indicates that blurring happens when "customers or
prospective customers ... see the plaintiffs mark used on a plethora of different
goods and services"); JASPER, supra note 8, at 32 (noting weakened connection be-
tween plaintiffs mark and their goods and services).
70. See Bible, supra note 49, at 305 (describing tarnishment as degrading posi-
tive association consumer has with mark).
71. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 54, § 24:104; see also Klieger, supra note 38, at
828-29 (noting tarnishment cases usually occur because junior mark is used to re-
present goods or services such as pornography or illicit drugs); see, e.g., Hormel, 73
F.3d at 507 ("The sine qua non of tarnishment is a finding that plaintiffs mark will
suffer negative associations through defendant's use."); World Wrestling Fed'n
Entm't, Inc. v. Bozell, 142 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (concluding
dilution by tarnishment possible through use of statements degrading WWFE and
WWF); NBA Props. v. Untertainment Records, LLC, No. 99 Civ. 2933, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 7780, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1999) (finding dilution by tarnishment
when producer of rap album published magazine advertisement using NBA basket-
ball player logo altered by placing gun in player's hand alongside words "Sports,
Drugs, and Entertainment"); Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, No. H-97-1855,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5890, at *16 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 1998) (finding tarnishment
from use of "The Polo Club" for adult entertainment venue); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (replacing slogan
"Enjoy Coca Cola" with "Enjoy Cocaine"). A mark may also be tarnished when a
junior user links a domain name associated with the senior mark to a website con-
taining adult entertainment. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Jcom, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7191
(SS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16195, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1998) (advertising
[Vol. 9: p. 321
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fies a certain good or service, tarnishing reduces the level of quality
or favorable status the mark once possessed. 72 Under these circum-
stances, courts will grant an injunction to bar any further use of the
mark by a junior user.73 Remedial measures focus on protecting
the mark from continued imitation by recognizing one user's ability
to initiate blurring of the mark.74 The junior user, however, may be
able to successfully defend itself by proving that the mark is not
famous or has not been tarnished or blurred by the junior mark's
use.
75
sexually explicit video conference on website under trademark "Barbie's Play-
house"); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, No. C96-3381CW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17090, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1996) (using "adultsrus.com" for website selling
adult sexual products); Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., No. C96-
130WD, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996) (using
"candyland.com" for Internet web site showing sexually explicit pictures).
72. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 54, § 24:95 (suggesting tarnishment, like blur-
ring, fulfills statutory requirement under FTDA).
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (allowing only injunc-
tive relief unless proof of willful intent); see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider
Webs, Ltd., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1045 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (granting injunctive relief
when website used domain name similar to plaintiffs trademark to make negative
remarks about alcohol use). The FTDA does not provide relief for "(A) [flair use
of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or
promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous
mark[;] (B) [n]oncommercial use of a mark[;] (C) [aIll forms of news reporting
and news commentary." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (4) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Although
those involved in the entertainment industry often encounter satire or parody of
their work, no monetary or injunctive relief is provided under the FTDA. See Dr.
Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997)
(indicating parody is not defense to trademark claim, but instead one factor to be
considered); see also STIM, supra note 8, at 15 (noting FTDA does not protect
against comparative advertising, non-commercial satire or parody or news
reporting).
74. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 54, § 24:94 ("Like being stung by a hundred
bees, significant injury is caused by the cumulative effect, not by just one.").
75. See STIM, supra note 8, at 148 (noting that disproving blurring or tar-
nishing requires factual or survey evidence). For example, the owners of the mark
"Spam" claimed dilution by the junior user naming a Muppet based on a wild boar
"Spa' am." See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 501-02. The junior user was able to show various
other ridicules concerning "Spam" to demonstrate that an association with a wild
boar would not further tarnish the mark. See id. at 501 (indicating cartoons and
articles have mocked "Spam" because of ingredients in product). Cf Playboy En-
ters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1088-89 (C.D.
Cal. 1999) (denying injunction because lack of proof regarding tarnishment or
blurring to trademark).
The junior user also has other defenses, including abandonment, genericness,
trademark misuse, fair use, free speech and parody, estoppel, laches, trade dress
and product configuration defenses. See STIM, supra note 8, at 148-49. The FTDA
also provides defenses when the mark is used in comparative advertising, a non-
commercial way or news reporting. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (3) and (4).
333
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Even after Congress enacted the FTDA, courts failed to unify in
their decisions on dilution.7 6 This division between courts may
have transpired because of the failure of dilution law to rest on the
traditional trademark goal of protecting consumers. 77 As a result, a
struggle ensued to convince various courts that the FTDA provided
new trademark remedies, separate from those traditionally available
under trademark infringement. 78 Additionally, the language used
by the FTDA varies slightly from the language used in the state stat-
utes. 79 This disparity also caused courts to develop alternative stan-
dards for proving dilution, requiring the owner of the senior mark
to demonstrate either a "likelihood of dilution" or "actual
dilution."80
The Fourth Circuit was among the first to consider whether
demonstrating a "likelihood of dilution" standard is sufficient to
state a cause of action under the FTDA.81 In Ringling Bros.-Barnum
& Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development,82
the plaintiff alleged that Utah's use of "The Greatest Snow on
Earth" mark diluted their mark, "The Greatest Show on Earth."83
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and de-
76. For discussion of tension between the circuits, see infra notes 81-100 and
accompanying text.
77. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 54, § 24:90 (concluding anti-dilution law
strongly resembles trespass law and not traditional consumer protection).
78. See Rayner, supra note 65, at 96. Courts may have been reluctant to stray
from the requirement of consumer confusion due to the abundance of precedent,
which made it simpler and more efficient for courts to analyze dilution. See Mc-
Cabe, supra note 5, at 1859.
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The FTDA uses the
language "causes dilution," however most state statutes provide relief under "likeli-
hood of dilution" language. See id.; see also Bullock, supra note 41, at 5 (observing
differences between FTDA and state anti-dilution statutes).
80. See Bible, supra note 49, at 307 (indicating development of inconsistent
standards of proof in dilution cases); see also Lewis R. Clayton, Judiciary Debates
Software That Monitors Employee Internet Access, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 29, 2001, at 3 (noting
Third Circuit also agreed FTDA requires "likelihood of dilution" standard);
Dalickas, supra note 10 (noting Second, Sixth and Seventh Circuits require "likeli-
hood of dilution" standard, while Fourth and Fifth Circuits require "actual dilu-
tion" standard).
81. See Rayner, supra note 65, at 97-98 (analyzing Fourth Circuit's decision
that required proof of "actual dilution").
82. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
83. See id. at 452. Ringling Brothers has similarly defended their trademark in
the past. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-
Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 481 (7th Cir. 1988) (enjoining used car
dealer from using mark "The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth" because it blurred
"The Greatest Show on Earth"); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. B.E. Windows, Corp., 969 F. Supp. 901, 903, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (conclud-
ing bar at top of World Trade Center called "The Greatest Bar on Earth" is not
willful infringement on "The Greatest Show on Earth" trademark).
Vol. 9: p. 321
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nied injunctive relief to Ringling Bros., holding that proof of "ac-
tual harm" is required to establish dilution. 84 In making this
determination, the court first construed dilution to require harm to
the mark's selling power, not harm to the distinctiveness of the
mark.85 The court relied on the plain language of the act to deter-
mine that the FTDA compelled proof of "actual dilution. ''86 An "ac-
tual dilution" standard requires that the plaintiff prove "an actual
lessening of the senior mark's selling power."87 The court recog-
nized that the "likelihood of dilution" provision, which was central
to the state anti-dilution statutes, was absent in the language of the
FTDA.88 The court ultimately found the only way to establish a les-
sening of the "capacity" of the mark is to require proof of actual,
present injury.89 Although the Fourth Circuit admitted the diffi-
culty in establishing "actual dilution," it rejected the notion that
proof was impossible.90 The court identified consumer surveys or a
decline in revenue as potential methods of proving "actual dilu-
tion."9 1 Suggesting ajunior mark may not always negatively affect a
84. See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 461. The Fourth Circuit interpreted the FI'DA to
require proof that:
(1) a defendant has made use of ajunior mark sufficiently similar to the
famous mark to evoke in a relevant universe of consumers a mental asso-
ciation of the two that (2) has caused (3) actual economic harm to the
famous mark's economic value by lessening its former selling power as an
advertising agent for its goods or services.
Id.; see, e.g., Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392-93
(D.N.J. 1999) (adopting Fourth Circuit's findings that FTDA requires proof of "ac-
tual dilution").
85. See Bullock, supra note 41, at 6 (identifying Fourth Circuit's focus on harm
to mark's selling power, not distinctiveness).
86. See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 458-59 (suggesting absence of "likelihood" in stat-
utory language is exactly what Congress intended); see also I.P. Lund Trading v.
Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Certainly it is not plausible to think
that Congress intended to protect aesthetic characteristics by simply assuming
harm or damages . . ").
87. Ringling, 170 F.3d at 458.
88. See id. (noting many commentators have recognized exclusion of "likeli-
hood" language from FTDA); see also Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings,
Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670 (5th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with Fourth Circuit that statute
requires proof of "actual harm" under plain meaning as evidenced by lack of "like-
lihood of dilution" standard prevalent in state anti-dilution statutes). But see
Klieger, supra note 38, at 840 (recognizing FTDA creates "actual dilution" require-
ment but Congress did not intend showing of "actual dilution").
89. See 4 McCARTHY, supra note 54, §24:94.1 (discussing determination of "ac-
tual dilution" standard).
90. See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 464 (acknowledging proof of "actual dilution" as
difficult, but not impossible). The court noted that lack of proof may be linked to
lack of dilution, not impossibility. See id. at 460.
91. See id. at 464-65 (listing three methods to prove "actual dilution" as being
proof of actual loss of revenues, consumer survey and relevant contextual factors);
see also Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 521-22 (E.D.
15
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senior mark's economic value, the court noted that a mark's added
attention is capable of creating enhanced consumer recognition. 92
In Nabisco, Inc. v. PFBrands, Inc.,93 the Second Circuit expressly
rejected the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the FTDA.94 In
Nabisco, Pepperidge Farm claimed that crackers used in a snack mix
produced by Nabisco strongly resembled their signature Goldfish
cracker.95 Because the two products were substantially similar, the
Second Circuit found a high "likelihood" that the Nabisco product
would dilute the distinctive character of Pepperidge Farm's famous
mark.96 Finding no reason to prevent the admission of persuasive
circumstantial evidence, the court concluded that "likelihood of di-
lution" was the appropriate standard of proof.97 Additionally, the
court found that demanding a plaintiff to show actual harm placed
an "arbitrary and unwarranted limitation on the available methods
of proof."98 In making this determination, the Second Circuit
Va. 2001) (requiring proof of actual economic harm through loss in revenues,
consumer surveys and contextual factors); Wawa, Inc. v. Haaf, No. 96-4313, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1996) (using survey evidence to
demonstrate dilution). In Wawa, a marketing survey introduced by the plaintiffs
concluded that twenty-nine percent of those in the neighborhood area associated
the HaHa with Wawa markets. See 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at *7-8.
92. See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 460 (suggesting replication of mark may be con-
sidered flattering); 2 GIlSON, supra note 8, § 5.12[1] [f] [v] [B] (addressing Fourth
Circuit's suggestion that senior mark's value could be improved by junior use).
93. 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
94. See id. at 223-24 (questioning whether Fourth Circuit adopted narrower
position, excluding inference of proof from "contextual factors," or broader posi-
tion, requiring proof of dilution by lost revenue or survey). The Second Circuit
eventually rejected both readings of the Fourth Circuit's position. See Nabisco, 191
F.3d at 223. Instead, the court recognized that "[t]o read the statute as suggested
by the Ringling opinion would subject the senior user to uncompensable injury."
Id. at 224.
95. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 212-14. The court suggested that,
"Pepperidge Farm has taken a unique and fanciful idea - creating a
cheese cracker in the shape of a goldfish - and turned this idea into a
signature . . . . Over time, the presence of Nabisco's goldfish-shaped
cracker ... is likely to weaken the focus of consumers ....
Id. at 214 (citing Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188 (S.D.N.Y.
1999)). Nabisco entered into a promotion agreement with Nickelodeon to pro-
duce cheese crackers in shapes based on CatDog, a cartoon of a two-headed crea-
ture that is half cat and half dog. See id. at 213. The fish cracker resembled the
favorite food of the cat half. See id.
96. See id. at 222 (determining that distinctiveness, degree of similarity, close
proximity of products and several other factors demonstrated dilution by blur-
ring). The fish-shaped crackers were similar in color, shape, size and taste. See id.
at 213. They differed only in that Nabisco's crackers were somewhat larger and
flatter and markings appeared on one side. See id.
97. See id. at 224 (noting similar admission of circumstantial evidence in
trademark infringement cases).
98. Id. at 223 (discussing Fourth Circuit's dismissal of contextual factors to
infer dilution); see also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468
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maintained that Congress intended to provide the senior mark with
relief before any harm could occur 99 Furthermore, the court be-
lieved the "actual dilution" standard would not only require that
harm had already taken place, but might also prevent a senior user
from ever demonstrating dilution. 100
TV. NARRATiVE ANALySIS
In Victoria's Secret, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether the Moseleys' use of the trademark, "Victor's Little Secret,"
diluted the "Victoria's Secret" trademark.10 1 More specifically, the
analysis focused on dilution by blurring and tarnishing. 10 2 Initially,
the court noted that the district court decided this case using a
four-factor test for dilution.103 Comparing this test to the five-factor
test used by the Second Circuit in Nabisco, the court found the only
variation was the added requirement of distinctiveness. 10 4 It stated
(7th Cir. 2000) (addressing immense difficulty in proving actual loss through sur-
vey evidence); 2 GILSON, supra note 8, § 5.12[1] [f] [v] [B] (suggesting Fourth and
Fifth Circuits may have set bar too high by requiring "actual dilution").
99. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223; see also Rayner, supra note 65, at 99 (conclud-
ing Congress clearly intended "likelihood of dilution" standard under FTDA). A
few months later, the Second Circuit denied the request by Federal Express for a
preliminary injunction against two Federal Espresso coffee shops in Syracuse, New
York. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 171 (2d Cir.
2000) (claiming dilution by blurring). The Second Circuit distinguished this case
from Nabisco because dilution of the "Federal Express" mark was not imminent as
in Nabisco. See id. at 178; see also 4 McCARTHY, supra note 54, § 24:94.1 (using water
erosion metaphor to suggest that "while Nabisco involved a flash flood which
would likely cause rapid erosion of the stream bed, the Federal Express case in-
volved a drop by drop trickle which would take some time to erode down the solid
rock").
100. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224 (arguing possible inability of demonstrating
diminished revenues). The court also criticized consumer surveys as "expensive,
time-consuming and not immune to manipulation." Id.
101. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d 464, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (indicating
Moseleys' request Sixth Circuit overturn decision).
102. See id. at 477 (concluding that blurring occurred by linking Victoria's
Secret chain with Moseleys' single establishment and tarnishing occurred by associ-
ation of "Victoria's Secret" mark with sex toys).
103. See id. at 469. The four-factor test required the plaintiff to prove:
(1) the mark is famous; (2) the defendant is making a commercial use of
the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant's use began after the mark
became famous; and (4) the defendant's use of the mark dilutes the qual-
ity of the mark by diminishing the capacity of the mark to identify and
distinguish goods and services.
Id. (quoting Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir.
1998)).
104. See id. Two months before the district court's decision in this case, the
Sixth Circuit adopted the dilution standard set forth in Nabisco. See id. at 468 (indi-
cating Sixth Circuit decided Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562 (6th Cir.
2000), which adopted dilution standard described in Nabisco). The Nabisco court
17
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that to acquire protection under the FTDA, a trademark must not
only be classified as famous, but also as highly distinctive. 0 5 The
FTDA developed several factors courts can utilize when considering
whether a mark is famous and distinctive. 0 6
determined that in order for a plaintiff to succeed on a federal claim of dilution
"(1) the senior mark must be famous; (2) it must be distinctive; (3) the junior use
must be a commercial use in commerce; (4) it must begin after the senior mark
has become famous; and (5) it must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the
senior mark." 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999). Although in Nabisco the Second
Circuit recognized the ultimate purpose of dilution law as protection of the mark's
selling power, the court concluded that to protect selling power requires an abso-
lute protection of the trademark's distinctiveness. See id. (discussing legislative his-
tory does not mention selling power); see also Schechter, supra note 37, at 831
(noting once mark has lost its distinctiveness, it has begun to lose its selling power
and to wait for complete loss of selling power would create irrecoverable loss to
public perception).
105. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 470. In Nabisco, the Second Circuit de-
scribed distinctiveness as levels of a ladder; the higher up on the ladder, or the
more distinct, greater protection is afforded to the trademark. See 191 F.3d at 215.
First, the generic words that name the object to which the mark applies are on the
bottom, which are totally without distinctiveness and are not given protection
against dilution. See id. Next, "descriptive" marks have little distinctiveness be-
cause they simply describe the product. See id. Third, the "suggestive" marks, be-
cause they suggest but do not describe the qualities of the product, have varying
protection. See id. The highest rung on the ladder is reserved for marks that are
arbitrary and fanciful and have no logical relationship between the mark and the
product. See id. at 216. Cf Rayner, supra note 65, at 104-05 (describing levels of
distinctiveness as spectrum with fungible marks on extreme left and famous marks
on extreme right, with famous marks protected under FTDA).
A debate exists regarding the interrelation between the requirements of dis-
tinctiveness and fame in dilution cases. See Rayner, supra note 65, at 100. The
Second Circuit treated distinctiveness and fame as separate elements in Nabisco
and found also that even if the mark was famous, protection would be denied if
there was no demonstration of distinctiveness. See id. The Third Circuit disagreed,
holding there is no separate requirement for distinctiveness and fame, and to do
so would be redundant. See Additional Developments, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487,
.507 (2001) (indicating court in Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports
News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000), recognized conflict with Second Cir-
cuit); see also Dalickas, supra note 10, at 12 (suggesting Third Circuit "[is] 'strad-
dling' the circuit split as to distinctiveness").
106. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 468 (explaining FTDA requires proof that
use of junior mark begins after senior mark is famous and causes dilution of dis-
tinctive quality of mark). The FTDA created a list of eight non-exclusive factors to
determine whether a mark is distinctive and famous, which includes, but is not
limited to:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B)
the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods
or services with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of
advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the
trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the
goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recogni-
tion of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the
marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G)
the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
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The Victoria's Secret court first examined the Moseleys' claim
that the word "secret" is not distinctive. 10 7 The court, viewing the
"Victoria's Secret" mark as a whole, concluded that the mark pro-
voked no association with lingerie and deserved a high level of
trademark protection. 08 A junior mark must also be sufficiently
similar in order to dilute a senior mark.10 9 The Sixth Circuit
agreed with the district court's conclusion that "Victor's Little Se-
cret" was sufficiently similar to "Victoria's Secret."'"10
The Sixth Circuit also explored the dilution of the "Victoria's
Secret" trademark."' The court recognized that circuits consider-
ing the FTDA have adopted tests containing essentially the same
qualities."l 2 A split has developed, however, among the circuits re-
garding the element of actual, present injury. 113 The court ex-
plored the analysis of the dilution claim by examining two leading
cases for the requirement of "actual harm."' 14 In reaching its deci-
sion, the court looked to the language, legislative history and Con-
gressional intent behind the FTDA, as well as the factors used in
determining a dilution claim. 115
and (H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3,
1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Registration of a mark is not re-
quired, but it will help in determining distinctiveness. See Dalickas, supra note 10.
107. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 470 (raising claim that "secret" is synony-
mous with lingerie, so it cannot be considered arbitrary and fanciful).
108. See id. (noting "secret" does not automatically make people think of lin-
gerie, nor does it describe underwear). The court pointed out that the anti-dissec-
tion rule "serves to remind courts not to focus only on the prominent features of
the mark, or only on those features that are prominent for purposes of the litiga-
tion, but on the mark in its totality." Id. (citing Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys.,
165 F.3d 419, 423 (6th Cir. 1999)).
109. See id. at 471; see also Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., No. 4:99-cv-91,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14451, at *30 (following "sufficient similarity" requirement
noted in Victoria's Secret).
110. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 471 n.3 (stating Nabisco requires that "the
mark must be of sufficient similarity so that, in the mind of the consumer, the
junior mark will conjure an association with the senior").
111. See id. at 471 (explaining issue revolves around whether Moseleys' mark
dilutes "Victoria's Secret" mark).
112. See id. (recognizing disparity exists in level of detail applied to claim).
113. See id. (noting split centered on "whether a plaintiff must prove actual,
present injury to its mark to state a federal dilution claim").
114. See id. at 471-72 (describing split between Fourth Circuit in Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d
449 (4th Cir. 1999), and Second Circuit in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191
F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999)). For a description of the two leading cases, see supra
notes 81-100 and accompanying text.
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1. Language, Legislative History and Congressional Intent behind the
FFDA
The court stated that the legislators wanted to ensure a nation-
wide remedy for dilution. 1 6 The court pointed to the legislative
history of the statute to identify their logic. 1 17 The Congressional
Record states:
Dilution is an injury that differs materially from that aris-
ing out of the orthodox confusion. Even in the absence of
confusion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated by
another's use. This is the essence of dilution. Confusion
leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection,
which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the ad-
vertising value of the mark.118
In analyzing this passage, the court expanded on two important,
emerging themes. 1 19 First, the court found that the passage dem-
onstrates that a dilution claim is a property right in the "potency" of
the mark and aims to provide a broad remedy.12 0 Congress bol-
stered the conclusion that the level of distinctiveness determines
the amount of protection afforded to trademarks. 12 1 Second, the
court construed the intent of Congress as allowing the senior mark
holder to seek a remedy before any economic harm occurs. 1 22 The
court noted that when a remedy becomes available, harm has not
yet taken place, therefore, plaintiffs must resort to costly surveys
that fail to portray an accurate picture. 123 The Sixth Circuit also
116. See id. (suggesting legislators attempted to provide dilution remedy dis-
tinct from protection for trademark infringement under Lanham Act).
117. See id. (indicating Congressional intent to establish expansive remedy).
118. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030.
119. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 475.
120. See id. (suggesting language of passage advocates broad remedy).
121. See id. at 475-76.
122. See id. at 476 (implying preventing "spreading infection" requires availa-
ble remedy before dilution causes economic harm).
123. See id. Survey evidence provides a scientific means of demonstrating
trademark dilution. See Bible, supra note 49, at 314-15 (describing process of ex-
perts gathering information and testifying to results in court). Courts are often
skeptical about survey evidence, but have considered such evidence useful in cer-
tain trademark-related claims. See id. at 316-17; see, e.g., Wawa, Inc. v. Haaf, No. 96-
4313, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11494, at *7-8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1996) (relying on
survey evidence to conclude "HaHa 24 Hr." mark undermined strength of "Wawa"
mark). But see Bible, supra note 49, at 313 ("[W]here plaintiffs seek preliminary
injunctive relief to prevent ajunior user's products from entering the market, sur-
vey evidence of actual dilution will be unavailable, and courts will have to rely on a
likelihood of dilution standard.").
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disbelieved that Congress intended to establish a statute with an un-
attainable standard of proof.124 Attempting to demonstrate this dis-
belief, the court cited the admission by the Fourth Circuit
concerning the difficulty, but not impossibility, in proving "actual
harm.1 25 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the Second Circuit, how-
ever, by interpreting congressional intent to allow an inference of
"likely harm.1 26
2. Factors In Considering Dilution Claim
To decipher whether dilution has occurred, the Second Circuit
developed a nonexclusive list of ten factors.1 27 The Victoria's Secret
court adopted this list, stating that the factors encompass considera-
tions a court must weigh in evaluating a claim under the FTDA.
128
Those factors are:
[D]istinctiveness; similarity of the marks; "proximity
of the products and the likelihood of bridging the gap;"
"interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior
mark, the similarity of the junior mark, and the proximity
of the products;" "shared consumers and geographic limi-
tations;" "sophistication of consumers;" actual confusion;
"adjectival or referential quality of the juniors use;" "harm
to the junior user and delay by the senior user;" and "ef-
fect of senior's prior laxity in protecting the mark."
1 29
124. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 476.
125. See id. (recognizing Fourth Circuit in Ringlingadmitted difficulty in prov-
ing "actual dilution").
126. See id. But see Seitz, supra note 4, at 153 ("It is clear that Congress deliber-
ately left out word 'likelihood' in its drafting of FTDA.").
127. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2d Cir. 1999).
In a case involving the New York anti-dilution statute, Judge Sweet identified perti-
nent factors to determine dilution of a mark. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring). The
Mead Data list, often referred to as the "Sweet factors," looks at "1) similarity of the
marks; 2) similarity of the products covered by the marks; 3) sophistication of con-
sumers; 4) predatory intent; 5) renown of the senior mark; 6) renown of thejunior
mark." Id. The Nabisco court rejected the use of the "Sweet factors," allowing
courts deciding cases under the new federal statute to look beyond the six factors
to determine dilution. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 227 (indicating deficiencies in Mead
Data list when applied to federal statute).
128. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 476. The court found that even without
complete consideration of all ten factors listed in the Nabisco test, Victoria's Secret
prevailed. See id. at 477 (leaving further explanation to develop on case-by-case
basis over time).
129. Id. at 476 (quoting Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217-22).
21
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The Sixth Circuit agreed that the "Victoria's Secret" mark is
"highly similar" and "semantically almost identical" to the 'Victor's
Little Secret" mark and deserved of a high degree of trademark
protection because of its distinctiveness. °3 0 The court also con-
cluded that an average consumer would associate "Victor's Little
Secret" with "Victoria's Secret" because both sell lingerie.' 3 ' Sup-
porting the district court's findings that variations in the quality of
products sold and sophistication of lingerie consumers prevented
actual confusion, the court indicated that a consumer is not going
to look for a "Miracle Bra" in the Moseley's store.'3 2 Consumers
will automatically think of Victoria's Secret when they hear the
name "Victor's Little Secret," causing blurring by connecting the
single establishment with the chain store. 133 The Moseleys' inven-
tory also creates a tarnishing effect upon the "Victoria's Secret"
mark.13 4 The district court determined that although adult videos,
sex toys and other adult novelties "may not be unsavory to all, its
more risque quality widely differentiates it from [products sold by
Victoria's Secret.] "135 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment to enjoin the Moseleys
from making further use of the "Victor's Little Secret" mark. 13 6
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIs
The Victoria's Secret court, confronted for the first time with
conducting a full examination of a dilution claim, articulated a
sound analysis under the "likelihood of dilution" standard. 13 7 Its
130. Id. (indicating similarities between marks).
131. See id. at 477. The fact that they both sell lingerie is not necessarily an
important factor. See Ahearn, supra note 45, at 896 (noting unlike traditional
trademark law, which normally applies only to competing goods and services, dilu-
tion applies to both competitive and noncompetitive goods).
132. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 477 (acknowledging distinction between
dilution and trademark infringement). The Second Circuit in Nabisco included
the determination of the presence or absence of confusion in a dilution analysis.
See 191 F.3d at 212; see also Rayner, supra note 65, at 102 (noting court went beyond
finding that dilution and infringement are not mutually exclusive). In contrast,
the Ninth Circuit held that a likelihood of confusion analysis should not be in-
cluded. See id. at 102-03 (concluding "[d]ilution and infringement seek to protect
different aspects of trademarks"); see also Ahearn, supra note 45, at 895-96 (noting
dilution focuses on protection of trademark identification value, not on protection
of consumers from confusion).
133. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 477.
134. See id.
135. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1092, 1096
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 9, 2000).
136. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 477.
137. See id. at 471 (acknowledging Sixth Circuit has ruled on issues of dilu-
tion, but has not conducted full analysis under FTDA).
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interpretation is consistent with prior dilution case law and the leg-
islative intent of the FTDA. 138 Consequently, the court strength-
ened the consensus among the majority of circuits by finding that a
required demonstration of "actual dilution" as inappropriate.
13 9
Before the FTDA, state statutes adopted modified versions of
Schechter's proposal and looked to the likelihood of a confusion
claim under trademark infringement to institute the standards for
dilution. 140 Those standards, according to some circuits, are re-
flected by judges who search for help in interpreting the FTDA.141
These circuits emphasize that looking to those standards is incor-
rect, and the true interpretation of the FI'DA lies in its plain mean-
ing, which requires proof of "actual dilution."142 Those circuits,
however, fail to recognize that the Supreme Court held that the
plain meaning should be used to interpret a federal statute, unless
the plain meaning is incompatible with Congress' intent.1 43 While
on its face, the F-FDA appears to endorse proof of "actual dilution,"
the intent behind it indicates otherwise. 144 Like the Second Cir-
cuit, the Sixth Circuit made this required analysis, and argued that
138. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir.
1999); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2000).
139. See, e.g., Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223; Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141
F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding dilution of mark due to effects on poten-
tial customers).
140. See Ahearn, supra note 45, at 901.
141. See Christina M. Bidlingmaier, Note, No More Clowning Around: Ringling
Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Devel-
opment Evaluates the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 279,
288 (2000) (noting cases following "likelihood of dilution" or using "Sweet factors"
are interpreting FTDA according to state statutes); see, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum
& Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th
Cir. 1999) ("[T]he Mead-factor analysis simply is not appropriate for assessing a
claim under the federal Act."). Cf Victoria's Secret, 295 F.3d at 473 n.5 (recognizing
Mead has been largely discredited by courts interpreting FTDA).
142. See, e.g., Ringling, 170 F.3d at 461 (noting "likelihood of dilution" is not
included in FTDA); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F.
Supp. 2d 1070, 1075-76 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (rejecting claim of dilution based on lack
of evidence indicating actual harm to Playboy's mark); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Nu-
traceutical Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392 (D.N.J. 1999) (offering no evidence of
actual dilution by junior user incorporating colors of spectrum on label); cf
Klieger, supra note 38, at 840 (agreeing FTDA creates "actual dilution" require-
ment, but determines application of actual dilution "erects an impenetrable bar-
rier to any federal dilution action .... Congress did not intend to require, nor do
courts interpret the Act to require, a showing of actual dilution").
143. See Slonaker, supra note 9, at 143 (citing Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park
& Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194, 197-98 (1985)).
144. See id. at 140 (noting FTDA's use of term "capacity" in definition of dilu-
tion, without further explanation, cannot indicate possibility of future dilution).
But see Rayner, supra note 65, at 99-100 (arguing term "capacity" is synonymous
with "potential," illustrating "theoretical lessening of the mark's potential to iden-
tify and distinguish goods or services").
23
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Congress' intent could not have been to require "actual
dilution."145
The Victoria's Secret court used the congressional record to illus-
trate Congress' intent of requiring a "likelihood" standard.1 46 First,
the court highlighted the notion that the FTDA was designed to
provide a broad remedy for dilution. 147 Evidence of this intent is
apparent in Congress' understanding of the value of a mark's dis-
tinctiveness. 148 As Schechter acknowledged, " [t] he more distinctive
or unique the mark.., the greater its need for protection against
. . . dissociation from the particular product in connection with
which it has been used.' 49 Though the court admitted that Con-
gress' recognition of a property right in the "potency" of the mark
does not go to the extent of claiming a property right in gross, it
does reveal support for enhanced protection of distinctive marks. 150
Second, the court found evidence of "an intent to allow a rem-
edy before dilution . .. actually caused economic harm to the senior
mark."15 1 The congressional record substantiates this intent by
describing what would happen if dilution were prolonged, analogiz-
ing to the harmful effects of a spreading infection.1 52 Recognizing
that providing evidence of "actual harm" would be extremely diffi-
cult, the court concluded that an injunction becomes available only
after the harm has taken place. 153 Because the FI'DA only provides
145. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 476. The Nabisco court found that inter-
preting the Act to require "actual dilution" depended on "excessive literalism."
191 F.3d at 224.
146. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 475-76; see also Rayner, supra note 65, at 99
(concluding that after analyzing statute, it is clear "likelihood of dilution" is what
Congress intended).
147. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 475.
148. See id. at 475-76 (recognizing Congress did not follow Schechter's dilu-
tion analysis, but understood importance of protecting mark's distinctiveness).
149. Schechter, supra note 37, at 825. For a discussion of the levels of distinc-
tiveness, see supra note 105.
150. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 475-76. But see Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 459 (4th
Cir. 1999) (claiming had Congress intended property-right-in-gross interpretation,
they would have made language perfectly clear); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,
191 F.3d 208, 224 n.6 (2d Cir. 1999) (agreeing with Fourth Circuit that property-
right-in-gross is not created by dilution statutes); Magliocca, supra note 8, at 981
(recognizing that because trademark rights last forever if mark identifies specific
source, if dilution creates property rights similar to copyrights and patents, which
are protected only for certain period of time, it would create constitutional
problems).
151. Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 476.
152. See id. at 475-76. "Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is
an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value
of the mark." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995)).
153. See id. at 476.
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injunctive relief in the absence of willful intent, a remedy would
become virtually meaningless, as the harm would have already oc-
curred. 54 Such harm would diminish all the time and money in-
vested in creating a senior mark's goodwill. 155 Ajunior mark would
also suffer severe consequences if the court determined dilution
had occurred.1 56 The outcome under the "actual dilution" stan-
dard would directly conflict with the ability to provide a broad rem-
edy, which the court found inherent in Congress' intent.157 A
senior mark would instead have to wait until its records could
demonstrate a loss in sales, which may never occur if the senior
mark continued to have growing success. 158 Such a strict standard
154. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also Nabisco, 191
F.3d at 224 (holding "[t]o read the statute as [requiring proof of actual harm]
would subject the senior user to uncompensable injury"); Rayner, supra note 65, at
99 (observing "if Congress had intended to require the occurrence of actual dilu-
tion prior to a cause of action arising, a claim of dilution might never be possi-
ble"); cf Swann, supra note 37, at 767-68 (concluding survey demonstrated dilution
already caused irreparable harm); Slonaker, supra note 9, at 144-45 (suggesting
consumer association between marks "is not only difficult to compensate, but also
causes irreparable harm to the identifying function of a trademark"). In Utah,
when asked to complete the following statement "The Greatest - on Earth,"
twenty-five percent of respondents used the word "show" and associated the state-
ment with Ringling Bros. Circus; twenty-four percent used the word "snow" and
associated the statement with Utah; and twenty-one percent completed and associ-
ated the statement with both. See Ringling, 170 F.3d at 462-63 (finding, however,
clear evidence demonstrating lack of dilution because those surveyed and filled in
blank using both "show" and "snow" did not associate "The Greatest Show on
Earth" with "The Greatest Snow on Earth").
155. See Slonaker, supra note 9, at 144-45 (suggesting famous mark holder will
have to watch mark's goodwill and economic value deteriorate). If a senior mark
must allow the junior user to actually harm his mark, the "junior mark holders
might have the defense that the senior mark had lost its distinctiveness ... ." Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 467-68 (7th Cir. 2000).
156. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224 (describing harm that could happen to junior
user). For instance, if harm cannot be determined until the product is already on
the market, the junior user "will be obligated to spend the huge sums involved in a
product launch without the ability to seek prior judicial assurance that their mark
will not be enjoined." Id.; see also McCabe, supra note 5, at 1862 (noting substantial
investment junior user sacrifices in using mark that may later be enjoined). But see
Seitz, supra note 4, at 156 (indicating "actual dilution" standard will help junior
user because enjoined mark might never have caused dilution).
157. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 475. But see Lerner, supra note 57, at 430
(suggesting instances of improper injunctive relief resulting from overbroad inter-
pretation of dilution).
158. See Seitz, supra note 4, at 155-56 (recognizing possibility of unavailable
evidence delineating loss to senior mark, but suggesting possibility that even slight-
est slip in revenue would indicate actual dilution); see also 4 McCARTHY, supra note
54, § 24:94.1 ("[T]he Fourth Circuit's decision raised the required burden of
proof up to a level that perhaps few owners of famous marks will be able to success-
fully achieve.").
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allows the junior mark to falsely profit from recognition and good-
will established by the senior mark.1 59
By focusing on the impossible burden of proving "actual
harm," the Victoria's Secret court identified the flaws in this stan-
dard. 160 The Fourth Circuit maintained that proof of "actual dilu-
tion" is possible and listed proof of an actual loss of revenue,
consumer surveys and "relevant contextual factors such as the ex-
tent of the junior mark's exposure, the similarity of the marks,
[and] the firmness of the senior mark's hold" as acceptable forms
of proof.' 61 The Victoria's Secret court disagreed with the availability
of such evidence and, therefore, directly questioned the dependa-
bility of surveys.1 62 The court remarked that even the Fourth Cir-
cuit acknowledged the shakiness of surveys. 163 Subsequently, the
Sixth Circuit allowed demonstration of dilution by circumstantial
evidence and eliminated the need to conduct expensive surveys or
illustrate lost revenue. 164
VI. IMPACT
The FTDA offers trademark owners a "powerful tool" they can
utilize to protect their interests.1 65 The decision by the Victoria's
Secret court will help tip the scale further in favor of the majority of
circuits following a "likelihood of dilution" standard. 166 By re-evalu-
ating the "likelihood of dilution" standard, the court left the door
open for circuits that have not decided the issue or have failed to
159. See, e.g., E. &J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs, Ltd., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033,
1045 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (notingjunior mark chooses mark similar to senior mark in
order to profit from established goodwill).
160. See Victoia's Secret, 259 F.3d at 476; see also Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 468 (find-
ing plaintiff held to impossible level of proof under Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of FTDA).
161. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1999) (contending replicated use of
famous mark must cause decrease in selling power obtained from distinctiveness of
mark).
162. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 476. But see Seitz, supra note 4, at 156
(arguing survey conducted properly by independent third party very reliable).
163. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 473-74 (citing Ringling, 170 F.3d at 464).
164. See id. at 475 (citing Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224
(2d Cir. 1999)).
165. See Mahaffey-Dowd, supra note 40, at 423 (describing possibility of na-
tionwide injunctive relief if court finds dilution to trademark).
166. See Clayton, supra note 80 (recognizing Sixth Circuit adopted majority
position); Dalickas, supra note 10, at 5 (indicating actual harm not required by
most circuits for federal trademark dilution claim). The Second, Sixth and Sev-
enth Circuits require only "likelihood of dilution," while the Fourth and Fifth Cir-
cuits require proof of "actual dilution." See Dalickas, supra note 10, at 5.
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adopt a specific standard. 167 Such a standard allows trademark
owners to maintain the reputation that their consumers recog-
nize. 168 A broader remedy may also make ajunior user think twice
before choosing a trademark.1 69
Congress intended to create a national uniform approach for a
dilution action under the FTDA. 170 The FTDA, however, continues
to generate the same inconsistencies and confusion as state stat-
utes. 171 Circuits requiring an "actual dilution" standard disable the
federal attempt at uniformity because plaintiffs must seek relief
under less stringent state anti-dilution statutes. 72 The Victoria's Se-
cret court, however, exacted a broader remedy under the "likeli-
hood of dilution" standard, affording famous mark holders the best
possible protection from unauthorized use of their marks.173 By
looking to the FTDA's statutory history, the court re-exposed the
intent to prevent injury to the mark by providing relief before dilu-
167. See Dalickas, supra note 10, at 5 (indicating Eighth Circuit has not di-
rectly addressed dilution under FTDA).
168. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 475-76 (protecting mark before harm oc-
curs). But see Myers, supra note 62, at 278 (noting many commentators have criti-
cized federal dilution statute by suggesting it will lead to excessive litigation).
169. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224 (addressing issues junior user will face if
court finds dilution); see also Seitz, supra note 4, at 156 (suggesting junior user
select different trademark if nervous about diluting another mark).
170. See Lori Krafte-Jacobs, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act of 1995, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 659, 696 (1998) (motivating factor
behind FTDA was to provide nationwide solution); Ahearn, supra note 45, at 911
(discussing force behind FrDA). Schechter's concerns about the harm of dilu-
tion, which were supposed to be addressed under the Lanham Act, still exist. See
Ahearn, supra note 45, at 911; see also Swann, supra note 37, at 767 (describing
lessening of famous trademark's ability to identify and distinguish goods as matter
of common sense). "As a matter of common sense, when association begins, singu-
larity begins to end." Id. For a discussion of the court's analysis of the Congres-
sional intent behind the FTDA, see supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
171. See Bullock, supra note 41, at 6 (noting courts are no more successful at
agreeing on criteria under federal statute than under state statutes).
172. See McCabe, supra note 5, at 1862-63 (noting "actual dilution" standard
will increase claims made under less stringent state anti-dilution statutes, thus, con-
tinuing same problems FTDA intended to correct). But see Jonathan Mermin,
Note, Interpreting the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: The Logic of the Actual
Dilution Requirement, 42 B.C. L. REv. 207, 231 (2000) (speculating dilution would
replace trademark infringement if "likelihood of dilution" standard is followed,
because it is easier to prove than consumer confusion).
173. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 475. But see Klieger, supra note 38, at 865
(suggesting courts have directed protection to many trademarks and applied
FTDA broader than drafters imagined).
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tion caused economic harm. 1 74 Courts allowing a "likelihood" stan-
dard thwart the harm before it occurs. 17 5
With the continual melding of entertainment and the fashion
world, the court's implementation of a likelihood standard helps to
counteract dilution in the entertainment industry by disallowing
junior marks to "piggyback" on famous and established trade-
marks. 176 If the court had followed the "actual dilution" standard,
Victoria's Secret would have had to wait while their mark was associ-
ated with adult videos and sex toys, potentially causing harm to fu-
ture televised fashion shows, as well as the corporation's product
sales. 177 This harm is often the situation in many dilution cases
where famous trademarks are associated with pornography and the
adult entertainment industry. 178 Image and recognition are two
principal components in the entertainment industry for maintain-
ing viewer ratings and selling products. 179 Without the opportunity
174. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 475-76. But see Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 453 (4th
Cir. 1999) (indicating meaning does not leap from statutory text, but legislative
history advances "actual dilution" reading); Myers, supra note 62, at 303 (interpret-
ing statutory language to require showing of "actual dilution" to prevent in-gross
protection for marks).
175. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1999)
("[W]e read the statute to permit adjudication granting or denying an injunction
.. before the dilution has actually occurred."); see also Rayner, supra note 65, at 99
(noting harm would have already occurred when proof of actual dilution available,
making injunctive relief meaningless).
176. Compare World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Bozell, 142 F. Supp. 2d
514, 529-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), and Danjaq, LLC v. Sony Corp., CV 97-8414-ER
(Mcx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22231, at *14-16 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 1998), with Victo-
ria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 475-76 (applying same "likelihood" test in all three courts to
prevent dilution in entertainment industry). See also Bauder, supra note 25 (em-
phasizing Victoria's Secret's involvement in entertainment industry); Socha, supra
note 25 (same).
177. See Victoria's Secret, 259 F.3d at 467 (recognizing lower court concluded
that "while the Defendants' inventory may not be unsavory to all, its more risqu6
quality widely differentiates it from that of the Plaintiffs").
178. See, e.g., Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, No. H-97-1855, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5890, at *2-6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 1998) (finding dilution by tarnish-
ment from use of "The Polo Club" for adult entertainment venue); Mattel Inc. v.
Jcom, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7191 (SS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16195, at *1, 9-10
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1998) (finding dilution by tamishment from use of "Barbie's
Playhouse" on website offering sexually explicit video conference); Hasbro, Inc. v.
Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., No. C96-130WD, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626, at *3-4
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996) (using "candyland.com" for Internet web site showing
sexually explicit pictures diluted value of mark); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, No.
C 96-3381 CW, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17090, at *2, 6-7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1996)
(using "adulsrus.com" for website selling adult sexual products caused dilution by
tarnishment).
179. See Bidlingmaier, supra note 141, at 280, 300. Hollywood trademarks are
frequently sought after for use in the promotion and sale of products, causing
some celebrities to trademark their own images. See id. at 280 n.13 (citing Chris
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of an immediate remedy, a senior mark could suffer irreparable
harm to its goodwill and distinctive quality.1 80 Equally, a lack of an
immediate remedy for a senior mark, though appearing favorable
to ajunior mark, could be detrimental to ajunior mark in the case
where time and money are wasted on an eventually illegal mark.181
Courts are in need of a clear interpretation of the FTDA, espe-
cially with the increase in litigation involving dilution claims.18 2
Emerging issues of trademark dilution have escalated due to the
growth of the Internet and electronic commerce.' 8 3 As technology
continues to develop, problems have begun to materialize concern-
ing the use of trademarks as domain names.'8 4 With the click of a
button, a trademark can be linked to information contrary to its
established reputation. 8 5
Koseluk & Noe Gold, Over My Dead Body, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 9, 1999, at 16).
Famous movie characters also retain protection against dilution. See Danjaq, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22231, at *14-16 (noting likelihood of dilution due to consumers
associating "[d]efendant's Bond film with the identity and reputation of Danjaq's
Bond films").
180. See Rayner, supra note 65, at 99 (noting "actual harm" standard creates
hurdle impossible to overcome). For a further discussion on harm to senior mark,
see supra note 151-59 and accompanying text.
181. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999)
(indicating large investment is required for product launch). But see Seitz, supra
note 4, at 156 (noting "actual harm" standard helps junior user by allowing deter-
mination of dilution by placement of mark in commerce instead of presumption
of dilution). Also, if ajunior user is wary about the mark causing dilution, then the
mark should probably be changed to avoid a possible future conflict. See id.
182. See Myers, supra note 62, at 243 (observing trademark dilution decisions
almost doubled from around 96 in 1980s to 182 in 1990s).
183. See Deutsch, supra note 66 (noting use of electronic commerce can start
diluting mark practically overnight).
184. See Magliocca, supra note 8, at 1024 (suggesting Internet domain names
as important as storefront signs). Because there is no effective Internet directory
available, consumers will type key words into a search engine. See id. at 1025. The
search engine will retrieve websites containing the information designated in the
search. See id.
185. See id. at 1031 (describing process of using trademark references to
search engines to link trademark with sex or pornography). Dilution by cyber-
squatting is another method of dilution involving domain names. See 4 McCARTHY,
supra note 54, § 24:69.1. Cybersquatting occurs when a mark or company name is
used to create a domain name "for the purpose of relinquishing the right to that
domain name back to the legitimate owner for a price." Id. Dilution over the
Internet frequently affects the entertainment industry. See Cable News Network
L.P. v. CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 520-22 (E.D. Va. 2001) (asserting Chi-
nese website using domain name cnnews.com dilutes CNN trademark); Hasbro,
Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., No. C96-13OWD, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626,
at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996) (using trademark of popular children's board
game "Candyland" to identify sexually explicit Internet site); see also Chris Mar-
lowe, Aimster Hit By Copyright Suit, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, June 29, 2001 (describ-
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court needs to decide the standard of
proof a plaintiff must demonstrate in a dilution action. 186 Congress
must also intervene by further amending the Lanham Act to clarify
the requirements of dilution under the FTDA.18 7 Because the
FTDA is still in the early stages of development, an amendment
adopting a single standard would generate consistent application of
the statute.' 88 Despite this seemingly easy solution, the Supreme
Court and Congress continue to ignore the defined split among the
circuits. 18 9 Until courts have definite guidelines for determining di-
lution, some trademark owners will be subject to the harsh require-
ment of "actual dilution," while others will receive the intended
safeguards stemming from the "likelihood of dilution" standard.190
Jennifer Hemerly
186. See Dalickas, supra note 10, at 12 (indicating Supreme Court will have to
end circuit split); Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 170, at 696 (noting uniformity will not
surface until Supreme Court intervenes). The Supreme Court has denied certio-
rari for several cases decided under the FTDA. See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines,
Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1071 (2001); Sporty's Farm, L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
187. See Ahearn, supra note 45, at 918 (giving suggestions as to what changes
Congress should make). "First, Congress should amend section 43(c) (1) of the
Act to read '. . . if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes
[or is likely to cause] dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.'" Id. "Second,
Congress should amend section 45 to redefine 'dilution,' in terms consistent with
Schechter's original proposal, as 'the lessening of the mark's [distinctive capacity
to act as a powerful selling tool].'" Id. See also McCabe, supra note 5, at 1875
(identifying importance of revising FTDA to create intended dilution standard).
188. See Ahearn, supra note 45, at 918-19 (noting FTDA is not failed legisla-
tion because it is still young, and time exists to make necessary amendments to
require some approach by courts).
189. See Slonaker, supra note 9, at 153 (asserting disregard ofjudicial split has
created unreliable remedy for senior marks).
190. See Rayner, supra note 65, at 104-05 (stating courts need only worry about
protecting distinctiveness of famous marks).
* The Supreme Court granted certiorari on April 15, 2002, five months after
this Note was written.
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